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Narrative Theory and the Law:
A Rhetorician's Invitation to the Legal Academy
INTRODUCTION
Law's foundations are rooted in rhetoric. In ancient Greece,
rhetoricians trained citizens to defend themselves in the legal arena
and prepared citizens to participate in the polity. The scholarly
domain of rhetoric remains valuable to legal scholars and
practitioners for both its classical theories of persuasion and for
more contemporary rhetorical theory, especially the theories
exploring dramatism and the concomitant power of narrative.
Legal practitioners recognize the importance of storytelling in the
courtroom. Yet while lawyers recognize the effectiveness of
narrative and metaphor, they have largely ignored the rhetoric
rationale behind the potency of language. The study of law is, at its
base, grounded in the study of stories. Through the Socratic
method - another manifestation of Greek rhetorical theory -
professors and students laboriously proceed through cases to arrive
at fundamental principles of law. In courtrooms, witnesses tell their
stories, attorneys aim to make their client's story the most
persuasive, and the laws of evidence aim to diminish the impact of
the emotions engendered by these stories while privileging the
realm of rationality. Ultimately jurors arrive at verdicts based on
their stock of stories derived from experience.1 Stories, at their
base level, are integral to the study of law:
[L]aw is in a very important sense all about competing
stories, from those presented at the trial court - elicited from
witnesses, rewoven into different plausibilities by prosecution
and defense, submitted to the critical judgment of the jury -
to those retold at the appellate court, which must pay
particular attention to the rules of storytelling and the
conformity of narratives to norms of telling and listening, on
up to the Supreme Court, which must tress together the story
of the case at hand and the history of constitutional
interpretation, according to the conventions of stare decisis
1. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 7-8 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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and the rules of precedent, though often, because dissents are
allowed, presenting two different tellings of the story, with
different outcomes.2
The study of law and the practice of law are infused with stories,
and, thus, attention must be paid to the inherent power of stories.
In addition, while lawyers talk about the need to connect with
experience and common sense, they fail to explore the rhetorical
rationale for this necessity. Narrative theory explains the power of
stories and, perhaps most importantly, recognizes that stories do
not have to be exactingly accurate to be persuasive; rather, they
have to be plausible (narrative fidelity) and make sense (narrative
coherence).
3
Legal scholarship based upon narrative tends to focus on the
increasing use of narrative in the courtroom and the resulting
implications of such use for practicing attorneys. In addition, legal
theorists discuss the impact of narrative on the traditional rules of
the court, especially its challenge to traditional evidentiary theory
and its potential for empowering previously silenced voices.4 Paul
Gewirtz, in the introduction to a Yale symposium on narrative and
the law, wrote that "[b]ooks about law typically treat it as a bundle
of rules and social policies. This book is different. It looks at law
not as rules and policies but as stories, explanations, performances,
linguistic exchanges - as narratives and rhetoric." Gewirtz
implores legal scholars to cross disciplinary borders: "[T]his book
reflects what might be called an interdisciplinary leap - an a priori
commitment to the worth of engaging people from different
disciplines to confront problems of common interest."5 However,
Gewirtz acknowledges that most of the contributors to the
symposium "have no particular literary training or literary
expertise. "6
While literary training would assist in assessing the power of
narrative in the law, rhetorical training would immeasurably add to
legal scholarship in the realm of narrative. Rhetoric is, at its base,
the study of persuasion and the study of language in all its
permutations. Thus, rhetorical theorists would certainly applaud
2. Peter Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAw's STORIEs: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAw 14, 16 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
3. WALTER R. FIsHE , HuMAN COMMUNICATION AS NARRATION 5 (1987).
4. Symposium, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAw's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
5. See GEwIRTZ, supra note 1, at 4.
6. See id.
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this effort by legal scholars, while at the same time lamenting their
failure to cross disciplinary borders and thereby reach into the
wealth of knowledge and theory offered by rhetoricians. For in
failing to make such a leap, legal scholars make the all-too-common
mistake of separating rhetoric from form, of granting reason and
rationality an undeserved privilege over emotion and desire.
Through this disconnection of reason and emotion, through fatally
severing the very essence of humans as symbol-using creatures,
legal scholars miss the essential reason why language is persuasive,
ultimately capable of uniting and dividing. The dramatistic nature
of humans also provides the basis for democracy through the
functioning of the Constitution as a privileged document.
Therefore, to relegate the study of narrative to the form through
which such stories are transmitted is to dismiss the power of
stories in the very nature of language itself. Stories are controlling
because humans influence each other through symbols to create a
shared past and present, and to imagine a better future. In this
essay, I will focus on the dominant rhetorical theorist of the
twentieth century, Kenneth Burke, and his theory of dramatism. I
will also explore the work of Walter Fisher whose narrative theory,
grounded in the dynamics of dramatism, helps to explain why
stories are so persuasive.
I. KENNETH BURKE'S THEORY OF DRAMATISM
"Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever
there is 'meaning,' there is 'persuasion.' "I Every utterance is an
invitation to persuade, according to Kenneth Burke, because the
basic function of rhetoric is the use of words by human agents to
form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents -
rhetoric "is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a
function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the
use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in
beings that by nature respond to symbols."8
Inducing cooperation is only necessary because man is divided
- "[ildentification is compensatory to division. If men were not
apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician
to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one
substance, absolute communication would be of man's very
7. KENNETH BuRKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTVS 172 (1950).
8. See id. at 41, 43.
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essence. "9 Persuasion is not just the use of words; it is style itself,
it is form - "[ijn its simplest manifestation, style is ingratiation."'0
Form itself leads to persuasion:
Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation
regardless of the subject matter .... Thus, you are drawn to
the form, not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of
some "universal" appeal in it. And this attitude of assent may
then be transferred to the matter which happens to be
associated with the form.'
The seductiveness of form, as evidenced by the ritualistic power
of the courtroom, is possible because of the nature of man as a
symbol-using creature. To understand the psychology of persuasion,
one must understand the nature of human souls. Burke found this
necessary for "the arousing and fulfillment of desires." 2 Persuasion
entails the whole being: "[y]ou persuade a man only insofar as you
can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image,
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his."'3
"Man [is] the symbol-using, symbol-misusing, [and]
symbol-making animal."' 4 The ability to talk about the past, the
present, and the future is the only feature of humans that
distinguishes us from all other animals: "[L]anguage is a collective
product and the capacity of complex symbolic action is distinctive
of the human race."15 To study man is to study motives, why people
act as they do. Burke's analysis of motives has profound
implications for the study of law and for the investigation of the
reasons behind man's acts:
Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given
act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how
he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may
even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself.
But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives
will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what
was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did
it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).
1 6
9. See id. at 22.
10. KENNETH BURKE, PERMANANCE AND CHANGE 50 (1935).
11. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 58.
12. KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT 124 (1931).
13. See BURKE, supra note 7, at 55.
14. KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE As SyMBouc ACTION 63 (1966).
15. KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 300 (1945).
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By way of example, a few commonplaces in law illustrate the
potency of Burke's terminology. An act may be so heinous as to
dominate - a gruesome murder. An actor may similarly take
precedence - an F. Lee Bailey at trial. The scene itself may
overwhelm all others - the formality of the courtroom.
The above pentad of act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose
allows an explication of any persuasive act in terms of the
dominant ratios. Ten such ratios are possible: scene-act,
scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent,
act-agency, agent-purpose, agent-agency, and agency-purpose.
17
Burke in later works would add a sixth element to his pentad,
transforming it into a hexad, with his addition of the term attitude,
which he labeled an incipient action. It is attitude that lays the
foundation for action.
Basic to understanding Burke's terminology is distinguishing
action from motion:
As for "act," any verb, no matter how specific or how general,
that has connotations of consciousness or purpose falls under
this category. If one happened to stumble over an obstruction,
that would not be an act, but a mere motion. However, one
could convert even this sheer accident into something of an
act if, in the course of falling, one suddenly willed his fall.'
Lawyers make this very distinction between action and motion in
distinguishing act as a necessary element of many "causes of
action." Man is not punished for thoughts. Man is not punished for
mere motions. A classic example - being pushed onto another's
property - does not constitute trespass. Similarly, Burke is not
concerned with mere motion, or with the non-creative manipulation
of signs. While dogs, for example, can bark at another's approach,
they cannot converse about the past, present, and future.
Burke explicates the Constitution in terms of his pentad: "A legal
constitution is an act or body of acts (or enactments), done by
agents (such as rulers, magistrates, or other representative
persons), and designed (purpose) to serve as a motivational ground
(scene) of subsequent actions, it being thus an instrument (agency)
for the shaping of human relations."19 Yet the unity of a constitution
cannot disguise the basic divisiveness inherent in its terms:
16. See id. at xv.
17. See id. at 15.
18. See id. at 14.
19. See id. at 341.
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A constitution may ... propound a set of generalized rights or
duties, and all these may be considered a grand promissory
unity, a panspermia in which they all exist together in perfect
peace and amity. Yet when, in the realm of the practical, a
given case comes before the courts, you promptly find that
this merger or balance or equilibrium among the
Constitutional clauses becomes transformed into a conflict
among the clauses - and to satisfy the promise contained in
one clause, you must forego the promise contained in
another.
20
The ideals of the Constitution embody what should be, which is
intimately defined by what should not be: "For what a Constitution
would do primarily is to substantiate an ought (to base a
statement as to what should be upon a statement as to what is).
And in our 'agonistic' world, such substantiation derives point and
poignancy by contrast with notions as to what should not be."
2'
A system of law privileges the agent in an idealistic philosophy.
22
A system of law can unite by "aiming at a kind of justice that
mediated among the differing ways of differing classes."u However,
a system of law can also function as a "compensation for disunity"
- "hence, any term for 'ideal' justice can be interpreted as a
rhetorical concealment for material injustice, particularly when
the actual history of legal decisions over a long period can be
shown to have favored class justice in the name of ideal justice."
24
Over time, Burke writes that "our very notions of reality are
affected, since the idealistic fictions have been written into the very
law of the land, and the law is our 'reality' insofar as it is a public
structure of motives."25 Idealistic legal fictions become our reality:
The courts themselves often come to accept the ingenious
misinterpretations proposed by our corporation lawyers such
as the legal fiction that financial corporations are persons
(thereby deserving the freedom granted to human beings by
divine, natural, or Constitutional law). For the judges talk the
20. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 349.
21. See id. at 358.
22. See id. at 171.
23. See id. at 173.
24. See id.
25. See BuRKE, supra note 15, at 174.
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same language, usually having been corporation lawyers
themselves.
26
Thus, "an ideal ... may lead to new real conditions."27 Theories
of positive law are also encompassed by idealism, therefore
"constitutions and similar legal enactments are to be taken as the
ground by reference to which judgments of legality are
substantiated."28 The Constitution is thus accorded ultimate
significance as the ground for the United States legal system:
The idealistic perspective is further accentuated, in the
United States, by the fiction that the will of the people today
is consubstantial with the will of the Founding Fathers. Those
who established the Constitution are co-agents with those who
perpetuate it - and the document itself, considered as a
structure of motivations, is a creature of the human will.
Hence, though it is a ground of action, its essential feature is
in its derivation from the attitudes of human agents.
29
The Constitution provides the justification for the protection of
private property in the name of nationalism:
[TIhe greater the development of the financial rationale, the
greater is the "spirituality" in man's relations to material
goods, which he sees less in terms of their actual nature as
goods, and more in the "ideal" terms of the future and of
monetary (symbolic) profit. And any actual divisiveness in the
social body which the inequalities of money intensify, is one
more call upon idealistic philosophies of "unification," which
can set up group "ideals" (embodied in "laws") to protect
private wealth in the name of the commonwealth 0
Our Constitution emphasizes the protection of property in the
name of freedom. Freedom is to a great extent defined in economic
terms. The potency of the combination of freedom and economics
is self-evident - free-market capitalism, the triumph of truth in the
marketplace of ideas, freedom from want. The guiding principles




28. See id. at 175.
29. See id.
30. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 176.
2001
Duquesne Law Review
Constitutions are of primary importance in suggesting what
coordinates one will think by. That is, one cannot "guaranty" a
people any rights which future conditions themselves make
impracticable; and whatever the limits and resources of liberty
in the future may be, if they are there, they need no
Constitutional guaranty; but Constitutions are important in
singling out certain directives for special attention, and thus in
bringing them more clearly to men's consciousness. During the
era of the New Deal, for instance, we saw attempts to
introduce the "principle" or "directive" of "private economic
security without private property" into a Constitution that
lacked such a coordinate.
31
A constitution is necessarily selective, forcing a certain guiding
perspective:
A Constitution is "binding" upon the future in the sense that it
has centered attention upon one calculus of motivation rather
than some other; and by thus encouraging men to evaluate
their public acts in the chosen terms, it serves in varying
degrees to keep them from evaluating such acts in other
terms.
32
The partiality of language necessarily affects the scope of the
Constitution: "the Constitution, as a necessarily very limited
calculus of motives, must be used as the basis of reference, in
courts of law, for the judgment of acts more widely or richly
motivated.'33
Burke traces the development of constitutional law from a focus
upon "higher law" to a body of law that relies more and more upon
precedent. This, according to Burke, is backwards because it is the
present that should shape the past into an appropriate vessel to
guide the future:
The ironic fact about reference to precedent is that, in a
nation whose scenic conditions were changing constantly, one
might well expect precedent to count most if used in reverse.
That is, one might adduce precedents to justify the opposite
kind of decision now, on the grounds that the scenic
conditions are now so different from those when the
31. See id. at 367.
32. See id. at 368.
33. See id. at 374.
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precedent was established. However, "higher law" and the
precedents based upon it referred not to changing material
conditions, but to the kind of "immutable scene" that could be
idealized and generalized in terms of "eternal truth, equity and
justice."34
Law in the present defines the past in terms of an ideal future.
Man's grasp for the ideal is rooted in language itself.35 Thus,
Burke's theory of dramatism goes far beyond revealing the
effectiveness of any given piece of persuasion. It explains the very
structure of human society, for man's status as a symbol-using
creature has led to an elaborate hierarchy and, thus, a code of
behavior, inherent in man's invention of the negative and the
parallel rise of "shalt nots." According to Burke, "man is the
inventor of the negative."36 Man defines things according to what
they are not - God is immortal; freedom is not being restrained.
Man "is goaded by the spirit of hierarchy," with the resultant
compulsion for a "sense of order."37 This hierarchy, this sense of
order, has made man "rotten with perfection."38 As one example, in
the courtroom this hierarchy has resulted in a demand for the
highest measure of truth, and thus the necessity of taking an oath.
This hierarchy inevitably results in the creation of ultimate terms:
"There are two primary generalizations that characterize the quality
of motives: freedom and necessity. And whenever they appear, we
may know that we are in the presence of 'God-terms,' or names for
the ultimates of motivation."39 In our polity, we have a governing
document, the Constitution, with freedom as its core, the ultimate
God-term.
Language forms our reality, and necessarily alters this reality via
"terministic screens," resulting in "trained incapacity. "40 The
language of any field defines the nature of human perception.
Doctors see injury, insurance agents see losses and fraud, lawyers
see negligence and potential lawsuits: "Insofar as any science has a
34. See id. at 380.
35. For further analysis of American constitutional and political history, see Burke's
explication of strict and broad constructionalism, Justice Marshall's linguistic rationale for
judicial review, the President's role as national unifier, and the nature of political rhetoric as
secular prayer found in KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MoTivES 380-94 (1945).
36. James L. Golden et a., Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Theory of Rhetoric, in THE
RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 230 (1992).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 74.
40. See BURKE, supra note 14, at 44-62.
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nomenclature especially adapted to its particular field of study, the
extension of its special terms to provide a definition of man in
general would necessarily oversociologize, overbiologize,
overpsychologize, overphysicize, etc., its subject."41 Lawyers see
causes of action, recoverable losses, billable hours.
Hearken back to the governing principle in Burke's theory that
every utterance is an invitation to persuade. Every word, every
terminology is but a selection of reality: "Men seek for vocabularies
that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must
develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any
selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a
deflection of reality."
42
It is not surprising that law has become a business, that the
monetary motive has come to dominate the profession as it has
come to dominate society itself. Burke would posit that man's
hierarchical nature, combined with the separate and distinct
religious motives in our culture, has led to just such a unifying
structure: "For the incentive of monetary profit, like the One God,
can be felt to prevail as a global source of action, over and above
any motivations peculiar to the locale. And it serves the need of
empire precisely because it 'transcends' religious motives, hence
making for a 'tolerant' commerce among men whose religious
vocabularies of motivation differ widely."43
Burke is difficult to interpret, yet an understanding of his system
of dramatism and the corresponding terminology explains much
about human motivation and the privileged terms which we have
come to accept as natural:
And when we have arrived at the stage where the sheer
symbols of exchange are treated as the basic motives of
human relations, when we have gone from "God's law" to
"natural law," and thence to the "market law" that had become
a "second nature" with those raised in a fully developed
capitalist ethic, we find many pious apologists of the status
quo who would deduce human freedom itself from the free
market, as the only scene from which a free social act could
be drawn. They thus attribute to the mechanics of price the
position in the genealogy of action once held by no
distinguished a Personage than God Himself, formerly defined
41. Kenneth Burke, Dramatism, in THE RHEToRic OF WESTERN THOUGHT 241 (1992).
42. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 59.
43. See id. at 44.
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as the ground of all possibility.A
Money has become the motivation for action, in Burke's terms a
"transubstantiation," transformed from "its function as an agency of
economic action into a function as the ground or purpose of
economic action. That is, instead of using money as a medium to
facilitate the production and distribution of goods, men . . . [are]
moved to produce and distribute goods in response to money as
motive."45 This monetary symbolism brings with it a special
rationality: "Many acts that would be 'rational,' as tested by the
rationality peculiar to the monetary motive, would be 'irrational' in
its absence."46 Money is law's god, and we sacrifice ourselves on
the altar of billable hours.
Not all humans are constrained to the same extent by the
monetary motive. Burke recognizes that "the diversity of the
materials that compose the human situation necessarily involves a
corresponding diversity of motives. In this sense, each man's
motivation is unique, since his situation is unique, which is
particularly obvious when you recall that his situation also reflects
the unique sequence of his past."47 Yet there are overarching
motives that guide all men: "[T]here are motives and relations
generic to all mankind-and these are intrinsic to human agents as a
class."48 Money is one such "God-term" - "the monetary reference
is the over-all public motive for mediating among the endless
diversity of occupational and private (or 'preoccupational')
motives."49 Think of what this has done to our system of laws:
"[M]oney is not a mere agency, in our civilization, but is a
rationalizing ground of action."50 Thus, even those who attempt to
minimize this preoccupation with the monetary motive are defined
by their very attempt to escape it:
Given any pronounced social structure, there will be a
"psychosis" corresponding to it. That is, there will be a
particular recipe of overstressings and understressings peculiar
to the given institutional structure. And the tendency of the
culture will be to see everything in terms of this particular
44. See id. at 92.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 94.
47. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 103.
48. See id. at 104.
49. See id. at 111.
50. See id. at 113.
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recipe of emphases, as the typical apologist of ideal
laissez-faire capitalism would think "freedom" itself lost if we
lost "free market freedom," since he conceived of freedom in
these terms.51
Kenneth Burke's writings were shaped by the major events of the
twentieth century - the Depression, the New Deal, and World
Wars I and II. Such fundamental upheavals, though, were sound
fodder for examining the governing motives of the times, and the
resultant hierarchy that remains fundamentally unquestioned.
Kenneth Burke's writings, however, are not transitory impressions
because they are steeped in ancient Greek theories of rhetoric and
law. What Kenneth Burke brings to legal thought is a framework
for understanding why narrative is so powerful. It is powerful
because man is, at his base, a storytelling animal, so enmeshed in
language that its effects are invisible to most. As Burke states:
[O]ur concern is primarily with the analysis of language rather
than with the analysis of "reality." Language being essentially
human, we would view human relations in terms of the
linguistic instrument. Not mere "consciousness of abstracting,"
but consciousness of linguistic action generally, is needed if
men are to temper the absurd ambitions that have their source
in faulty terminologies. Only by such means can we hope to
bring ourselves to be content with humbler satisfactions,
looking upon the cult of empire as a sickness, be that empire
either political or financial.52
Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism provides a framework for
understanding man's unique nature as a symbol-using creature
whose distinct ability to use language provides the very foundation
for society, and results in a hierarchical order with the presence of
certain God-terms revealing the motives permeating his culture.
While difficult to digest on first reading, Burke's works are replete
with legal implications. His insights concerning the effectiveness of
dramatic form, the suggestive yet blinding perspectives inherent in
legal terminology, the power of the Constitution, and the current
dominance of the monetary motive in both society and law are
certainly instructive for legal scholars and practitioners.
51. See id.
52. See BURKE, supra note 15, at 317.
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II. WALTER FISHER: NARRATVE AS A PARADIGM FOR HUMAN
COMMUNICATION
Walter Fisher's narrative theory extends Kenneth Burke's premise
that man is fundamentally a symbol-using creature. Fisher focuses
on man's dramatic nature as a story-telling animal, defining man in
light of his distinct narrative character, and contrasting this
narrative preference with traditional theories of persuasion
privileging rationality:
In short, the narrative paradigm is a philosophical statement
that is meant to offer an approach to interpretation and
assessment of human communication - assuming that all
forms of human communication can be seen fundamentally as
stories, as interpretations of aspects of the world occurring in
time and shaped by history, culture, and character53
Fisher writes: "The Homo narrans metaphor is thus an
incorporation and extension of Burke's definition of 'man' as the
'symbol-using' (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal. "M Fisher
adheres to Burke's choice of identification as the fundamental
concept in persuasion: "The operative principle of narrative
rationality is identification rather than deliberation."-5 In its
essence, Fisher's narrative theory decries the privileged status of
the rational-world paradigm because it necessarily denigrates the
power of emotions and values in reasoning. The rational-world
paradigm separates reason from emotion in a false dichotomy that
eliminates the essence of persuasion: "The role of values in the
constitution of knowledge, truth, or reality has been generally
denied. The result has been that in serious matters of social or
political significance, technical discourse has been assigned almost
unquestioned superiority over rhetorical and poetic discourse."W As
an alternative, Fisher offers the narrative paradigm, integrating
reason and emotion into a coherent whole:
(1) Humans are storytellers. (2) The paradigmatic mode of
human decision making and communication is "good reasons,"
which vary in form among situations, genres, and media of
communication. (3) The production and practice of good
reasons are ruled by matters of history, biography, culture,
53. See FISHER, supra note 3, at xii.
54. See id. at 63.
55. See id. at 66.
56. See id. at xiii.
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and character.... (4) Rationality is determined by the nature
of persons as narrative beings - their inherent awareness of
narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and
their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether or
not the stories they experience ring true with the stories they
know to be true in their lives. (5) The world as we know it is
a set of stories that must be chosen among in order for us to
live life in a process of continual creation.5 7
Dramatism and narrative theory recognize that through language
man fundamentally structures society: "Knowledge... is ultimately
configured narratively, as a component in a larger story implying
the being of a certain kind of person, a person with a particular
worldview, with a specific self-concept, and with characteristic
ways of relating to others."- Fisher draws two distinctions between
Burke's dramatism and the narrative paradigm. First, Fisher
emphasizes the active role accorded people in the narrative
paradigm as they interpret and assess meanings in their choices of
behavior:
Burke's dramatism implies that people function according to
prescribed roles; they are actors performing roles constrained
or determined by scripts provided by existing institutions. The
narrative paradigm sees people as storytellers, as authors and
co-authors who creatively read and evaluate the texts of
life-providing "plots" that are always in the process of
re-creation rather than existing as settled scripts. Viewing
human communication narratively stresses that people are full
participants in the making of messages, whether they are
agents (authors) or audience members (co-authors).
59
Second, Fisher writes that Burke, although preferring the end of
humane, reasonable action, prefers a performance standard: "The
notion that people are actors leads to the supposition that human
behavior is to be assessed by a presentational standard. The
question becomes how well one performs one's various roles."60
Fisher's narrative paradigm cannot ensure the end of humane,
reasonable action, but it can further it through the assessment of a
57. See id. at 5.
58. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 17.
59. See id. at 18.
60. See id. at 19.
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logic intrinsic to narrativity.6 1
Fisher formulates a public, moral imperative that reclaims the
public's decision-making power from the realm of experts:
[S]ome discourse is more veracious, reliable, and
trustworthy in respect to knowledge, truth, and reality than
some other discourse, but no form or genre has final claim to
these virtues. Some persons know more than others, are wiser,
and are more to be heeded than others. But no one knows all
there is to know about his or her own area of specialization. I
contend further that human communication in all of its forms
is imbued with mythos - ideas that cannot be verified or
proved in any absolute way.
2
This is a valuable precept for legal scholars and practitioners. As
technology advances, and expert testimony extends its grasp over
the trial process, it is jurors who ultimately retain the
decision-making power. The tendency of legal practitioners to
downgrade the intelligence of the jury, especially if the decisions
rendered are adverse to their client, neglects the narrative wisdom
that attorneys should use to confine expert testimony and, thus,
win cases.
Emotions win cases more than reasoned logic. Fisher quotes
Cicero on this point: "For men decide far more problems by hate,
or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or
illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or
authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute."r
People persuade each other through stories because emotions rule
over strict logical precepts. Logic is not irrelevant, but it takes the
form of coherence and fidelity. Stories have to make sense and ring
true with experience. And to judge the truth of stories, the
character of the teller comes to the fore:
Human communication is tested against the principles of
probability (coherence) and fidelity (truthfulness and
reliability). Probability, whether a story "hangs together," is
assessed in three ways: by its argumentative or structural
coherence; by its material coherence, that is, by comparing and
contrasting stories told in other discourses (a story may be
internally consistent, but important facts may be omitted,
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See FisHEP, supra note 3, at 37.
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counterarguments ignored, and relevant issues overlooked);
and by characterological coherence.4
Stories are dependent on character, and the importance of
courtroom-based testimony logically follows from it: "Central to all
stories is character. Whether a story is believable depends on the
reliability of characters, both as narrators and as actors." 5
Evidentiary theory inherently recognizes and attempts to discount
people's reliance on past actions as predictors of future actions.
Nevertheless, jurors assess character by consistency:
Coherence in life and in literature requires that characters
behave characteristically. Without this kind of predictability,
there is no trust, no community, no rational human order.
Applying this consideration of coherence is an inquiry into
motivation. Its importance in deciding whether to accept a
message cannot be overestimated. Determining a character's
motives is prerequisite to trust, and trust is the foundation of
belief.
66
Fisher's assessment of the importance of motives also builds on
Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatism. Evaluating the merit of an
argument based on pure logical form, as in the syllogism, will not
explain the persuasiveness of stories:
The concept of narrative rationality asserts that it is not the
individual form of argument that is ultimately persuasive in
discourse. That is important, but values are more persuasive,
and they may be expressed in a variety of modes, of which
argument is only one. Hence narrative rationality focuses on
"good reasons" - elements that provide warrants for
accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of
communication that can be considered rhetorical.
67
Fisher provides a theoretical underpinning for what lawyers are
beginning to recognize - the power of stories in the courtroom:
"No matter how strictly a case is argued - scientifically,
philosophically, or legally - it will always be a story, an
interpretation of some aspect of the world that is historically and
64. See id. at 47.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 48.
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culturally grounded and shaped by human personality."6
What Fisher is proposing is not a disavowal of reason and
rationality, but rather a recognition that every form of persuasion
naturally reaches beyond the strict boundaries of traditional
argument through inclusion of both metaphor and mythos. Fisher
delineates the rational-world paradigm as a contrast to the
narrative paradigm. The rational-world paradigm presupposes that:
(1) humans are essentially rational beings; (2) the
paradigmatic mode of human decision making and
communication is argument - discourse that features
clear-cut inferential or implicative structures; (3) the conduct
of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations - legal,
scientific, legislative, public, and so on; (4) rationality is
determined by subject-matter knowledge, argumentative
ability, and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given
fields; and (5) the world is a set of logical puzzles that can be
solved through appropriate analysis and application of reason
conceived as an argumentative construct.
69
The rational-world paradigm presumes an informed citizenry: "It
further demands a citizenry that shares a common language,
general adherence to the values of the state, information relevant
to the questions that confront the community, and understanding of
argumentative issues, the various forms of reasoning, and their
appropriate assessment."70 The narrative paradigm does not deny a
hierarchy of stories. What it denies is the assumption that only
those formally schooled in reason and argument can make
legitimate judgments:
Narration implies, however, that the "people" judge the stories
that are told for and about them and that they have a rational
capacity to make such judgments .... The narrative paradigm
does not deny that the "people" can be wrong. But, then, so
can elites, especially when a decision is social or political ....
The sort of hierarchy to which the narrative paradigm is
inimical is hierarchy based on the assumption that some
people are qualified to be rational and others are not.
71
What the law is beginning to explicitly recognize is the
68. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 49.
69. See id. at 59.
70. See id. at 60.
71. See id. at 67.
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connection of values to reason - in Fisher's terms: "Humans as
rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they are reasoning
animals."72 Embracing the idea that all humans are capable of
judging the worth of arguments does not deny that, in specialized
fields, specific knowledge is necessary: "One establishes one's
rationality in special fields by knowing and using the warrants
indigenous to that field and adhering to the particular rules of
advocacy followed in it."73 If one is to be capable in law, for
example, it is necessary to know the laws of evidence. But these
are the constraints imposed by legal theory, and mastering these
rules is not equivalent to mastering the art of persuasion. Jurors
will be swayed by emotions, by stories, by the credibility of
witnesses, by their judgments of the character of defendants.
Although following a path distinct from Burke, who analyzed the
rhetorical basis of the Constitution, Fisher assesses the rhetorical
effectiveness of President Ronald Reagan to arrive at the same
fundamental bases of American political thought - economics and
freedom. Fisher labels these concepts "the materialistic myth of
individual success" and "the moralistic myth of brotherhood":
Each myth entails certain values. The materialistic myth
espouses a work ethic and endorses such qualities as effort,
persistence, "playing the game," initiative, self-reliance,
achievement, and success. Competition is its presumed way of
determining personal worth; hence the free-enterprise system,
freedom from controls and regulations; and ascent in society's
social-economic hierarchies are numbered among this myth's
implied goods. The moralistic myth is, for example, well
expressed in the Declaration of Independence: "all men are
created equal" and "are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights," among which are "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness." Governments "are instituted to secure
these rights," and governments derive "their just powers from
the consent of the governed." One should observe also that the
moralistic myth implies such goods as tolerance, charity,
compassion, and true regard for the dignity and worth of each
individual.
The materialistic myth fosters a concept of freedom to do as
one pleases; the moralistic myth stresses freedom to be as one
conceives oneself.7 4
72. See id. at 105.
73. See FISHER, supra note 3, at 120.
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Kenneth Burke's and Walter Fisher's close attention to the
hierarchical structure of language, and the resultant ideology
present in governing documents, reveals fundamental values that
orators would do well to pay homage to in their rhetoric.
Unification is achieved through adherence to fundamental values;
division occurs in conflict over specifics. Defining a client's actions
as consistent with these broad, governing ideals is critical to
successful persuasion.
A final note on Fisher: legal theorists sometimes suggest, and
rhetoricians commonly assert, that reasons are given to justify
decisions already made. Fisher would heartily assent: "I suggest
that all good stories function in two ways: to justify (or mystify)
decisions or actions already made or performed and to determine
future decisions or actions."5 Judges reach a conclusion about the
right outcome of a case, and find the law to justify such a decision.
Judges rely on precedent and continually affirm its worthiness
while manipulating the same precedent to reach their preferred
conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars are beginning to formulate theories that assess
why narrative is so powerful in the courtroom as well as in judges'
chambers. United States Supreme Court Justice David Souter, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, wrote: "Our Constitution is a
covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and
then to future generations. It is a coherent succession . . . . The
Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions
under circumstances in which their principled character is
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." 6 Justice
Souter's master narrative echoes Burke's concept of an "unending
conversation":
Where does drama get its materials? From the "unending
conversation" that is going on in history when we are born.
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you
arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in
a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause
74. See id. at 149.
75. See id. at 187.
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, as cited in Peter Brooks, The Law as
Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAw's SToRIEs: NARRATIE AND RHMORIC IN THE LAW 21 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
2001
Duquesne Law Review
and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion
had already begun long before any of them got there, so that
no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that
had gone before. You listen for a while, until you decide that
you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in
your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes
to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either
the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent,
depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance. However,
the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must
depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously
in progress.
77
Unfortunately, the conversation as it currently exists is being
carried on in different rooms, with disciplinary boundaries
unnecessarily constraining and, thus, warping the discussion.
Rhetoric and law developed concurrently, but have since traveled
separate paths. Kenneth Burke's dramatism and Walter Fisher's
narrative paradigm go far in explaining the power of persuasion in
the law. Legal theorists would do well to join in this conversation,
and rhetoricians would well serve society by inviting them into the
fold.
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